

Emotional contagion theory pdf

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In order to continue enjoying our place, we ask you to confirm your identity as a human. Thank you very much for your cooperation. Emotional contagion is the phenomenon that individuals tend to express and feel emotions similar to those of others. When someone tells you with a big smile that you passed an important test, you smile too. If, on the other hand, your friend tells you that your father died last week, you feel depressed, not so much by the memory of your friend's father, whom you do not know, but above all because your friend is so sad. In other words, not only observe your friend's emotions, but also affect your own emotional expressions and emotional state. Therefore, emotional contagion is a form of social influence. Context of emotional contagion and function Emotional contagion can occur between two people, but also in larger groups. Consider the collective anger that extends among a group of workers to their superiors, who argue that financial cuts are a necessary measure to make the organization healthy again; or panic that flows through a community, due to a series of crimes committed in the neighborhood; or the shared feelings of a crowd moved by a speech by its leader. In all these cases, emotions are largely caused because people catch each other's emotions: People are sad, elderly, scared or angry because they see others in their immediate environment experiencing these emotions. Why would emotional contagion occur? The most important function of emotional contagion is that it softens social interactions and facilitates mutual involvement and emotional proximity, as it helps to synchronize and coordinate interaction. Communication is simply better when you have the feeling that someone else understands your feelings and feels with you rather than when the other person is completely unaware of your emotions. This would not only lead to a better conversation, but can also improve feelings of intimacy or friendship with the other person. A similar function applies to larger groups where emotional contagion increases positive feelings among group members (and sometimes negative feelings towards group members) and therefore strengthens social bonds. Explanations of emotional contagion and evidence Emotional contagion has been described as a certain multiplied process, consisting of both the automatic processing of the non-verbal screens of others as well as in the processing of information more aware of the emotional expressions and behavior of others. Until now, most research has focused on the first aspect of emotional contagion, which has been called automatic mimicry: Unconsciously we tend to imitate and synchronize our own non-verbal expressions with other people's non-verbal expressions. Therefore, we smile, drown, move, we sit down or stay the same way as others, without necessarily being aware of our copying behavior. The body feedback of this would change our subjective feelings accordingly. In other words, we not only smile, or drown, but our smile or drowning makes us feel happy, or angry, according to these non-verbal screens. Several studies have supported automatic mimicry. For example, individuals show more fetal and sad faces in response to movie characters or mere photos that show the same expressions; they start yawning or laughing when seeing the other yawns or laughing; individuals even mimic others by touching their feet, stuttering, or expressing pain. It is less clear, however, to what extent people also feel similar emotions as a result of this imitation. In addition to this more automatic mimic behavior, individuals may try to empathize or identify with another person at a more conscious level, resulting in feeling and expressing similar emotions. There are different factors that can facilitate emotional contagion. The first factor refers to the nature of the relationship between people, that is, empathy. When individuals love, how they identify with others or share their goals, they are more likely to catch the other person's emotions. Therefore, the most intimate relationships are characterized more by emotional contagion than by relationships between professionals or strangers. In fact, it has been shown that dating partners and college roommates became more emotionally similar for a year. This effect of emotional contagion applied to both positive and negative emotional reactions to events and could not be explained by increasing similarity in personality variables. In addition, the amount of empathy you can feel with the other person also reflects individual differences: Some individuals are simply better able to empathize than others. Finally, empathy can also occur in less intimate relationships. Here, empathy may depend on whether one shares goals or not. For example, the expectation of cooperating with another person leads to more empathy. Other potential determinants of emotional contagion have barely been studied empirically. A factor can relate to the nature of the event that causes emotions in the first place. We can expect the emotions of others to be more contagious when the nature of the event it causes can be interpreted in different ways. For example, should you feel anxious (or calm) when you are in a waiting room for a medical test, or should you feel angry (or sad, or happy) in George W. Bush's administration for the war in Iraq? Yet another important factor may be the intensity of the emotional expressions of others and the nature of these emotions. When expressions are more intense, they can be more contagious; on the other hand, some emotions may be more contagious to nature than other For example, it's harder not to smile when someone smiles at you that it's not to flatter when someone drowns in you. Implications of emotional contagion Emotional contagion can explain specific collective behaviors, as well as emotional development Relations. Most research has focused on automatic mimicry, testing this phenomenon in different contexts and with various non-verbal behaviors. However, the phenomenon is still quite unexplored and needs further examination, particularly in terms of the conditions in which it occurs. References: Anderson, C., Keltner, D., & John, O. P. (2003). Emotional convergence between people over time. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 84, 1054-1068. 2002: Barsade, S. (2002). The undulant effect: Emotional contagion and its influence on group behavior. *Quarterly Administrative Sciences*, 47, 644-675. Hatfield, A., Cacioppo, J., & Rapson, R. L. (1994). Emotional contagion. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. Lungquist, L., & Dimberg, United States (1990). Facial expressions are contagious. *Journal of Psychophysiology*, 9, 203-211. Input Reader's Guide Entries A-Z Theme Index Icon Back to Entries Emotional Contagion is the phenomenon that individuals tend to express and feel emotions that are similar to those of others. When someone tells you with a big smile that you passed an important test, you smile too. If, on the other hand, your friend tells you that your father died last week, you feel depressed, not so much by the memory of your friend's father, whom you do not know, but above all because your friend is so sad. In other words, not only observe your friend's emotions, but also affect your own emotional expressions and emotional state. Therefore, emotional contagion is a form of social influence. Emotional contagion can occur between two people, but also in larger groups. Think about ... Entrada Entrada Entrada d'entrada D'intel·ligència emocional Control d'accio Comportaments antisocialsAttitudesCultureEmotionsEvolutionGroupsHealthHistoryInfluence Relacions personalsJuds i presa de decisionsMethodsPersonalityPrejudiceProblem ComportamentsProsocialsSelfSocial CognitionSubdisciplines Giuliana Isabella, Hamilton C. Carvalho, en Emocions, Tecnologia i Comportaments, 2016 El contagi emocional no sorgeix només en interaccions dyadiques o grups cara a cara. Various cultural artifacts are able to transmit emotions, such as movies, video tape, cartoons and songs. Researchers have shown that films are very effective instruments for communicating emotions. Several studies have obtained evidence that Duchenne's smiles (real smiles) appear in participants who are watching nice films (Ekman, 1993; Ekman & Friesen, 1982; Soussignan, 2002). Duchenne's smile is perceived as a more affectionate smile. Muscle movement is reduced, and the smile configuration is total and complete. Not only do Duchenne's smiles have more intensity compared to ordinary smiles, but they also differ in terms of their and the value of the social signal. Therefore, they are more likely to induce empathy compared to other smiles (Ekman, 1993). What about other emotions? In

situations where participants are seeing a nasty in video, for example, it is easy to identify the appearance of emotional contagion, including the corresponding facial expressions. In these cases, people usually show the classic face of disgust (Bavelas et al., 1986). In addition, participants in a study that saw a pre-recorded video tape of a target person describing the happiest or saddest events of their life tended to experience the same emotions (Hsee, Hatfield, Carlson, and Chentob, 1990). Television ads represent ubiquitous visual stimuli in modern societies. Edell and Burke (1987) showed that these ads can cause negative and positive feelings, and these emotional states are important predictors of the effectiveness of an ad. However, not only face-to-face interaction or videos can transmit emotion, or facilitate emotional contagion. Lundqvist, Carlsson, Hilmersson and Juslin (2009) demonstrated that music provokes experiential, expressive and physiological components of the emotional response system, supporting the idea that songs can act as instruments of emotional contagion. In his study, happy music, compared to sad music, generated more happiness and less sadness, more zygomatic muscle activity (the muscle that draws the angle of the mouth higher and later, known as the smile muscle), greater skin conductance and lower finger temperature. Therefore, the emotion induced in the listener was the same as the emotion expressed in the music is consistent with the idea that music can induce emotions through a process of emotional contagion (Lundqvist et al., 2009, p. 61). Other studies have used photographs as stimuli. Photographs are convenient laboratory stimuli, as they allow controlled time and exposure to intensity and exact reproduction within and between experiments and laboratories. According to Lang (1995), images can evoke the effect. The presentation of photographs can also incite initial reflections, in a process of mimicry. Mimicry occurs in response to pleasant and unpleasant images. The high degree of image-induced arousal is related to the intensity of imitation (Lang, 1995). A study by Isabella (2012) shows that emotional contagion of an image can also change consumer behaviors. To verify whether the emotion created in consumers comes from emotional contagion, he recorded the facial expressions of the participants. After analyzing the changes in their expressions, it concluded that participants who saw a smiling model in an ad mimicked the (smiling) image, thus confirming the process of emotional contagion. In addition, the positive emotion transmitted by the facial expression in the photos was associated with a positive evaluation of the product shown in the ad. As expected by the theory of emotional contagion, the ad with a positive expression provoked a more positive attitude, sympathy and a greater perception of reliability and purchasing intentions, compared to neutral L. Neumann, ... H. Rae Westbury, in Measures of Personality and Social Psychological Constructions, 2015The MDEES aims to measure different components of affective empathy. However, Caruso and Mayer (1998) warned against using the subscale of emotional contagion, as it contains only two elements. In addition, Olckers et al. (2010) conducted a CFA that could not verify the alleged MDEES structure. The reliability of test-retesting of the MDEES is also yet to be determined. Circle of the answer that best indicates how much you agree or disagree with each item. The suffering of others deeply annoys me. I rarely take note when other people are treated warmly. Being around happy people makes me feel happy, too. I want to cry when I see a sad movie. Mass is made of the suffering of pets or animals. I feel pain in others. My feelings are mine and do not reflect how others feel. Note: Items are rated on a 5-point Likert scale that ranges from 1=Strongly disagree' to 5='Agree'. Gerben A. Van Kleef, ... Antony S.R. Manstead, in Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, whose emotional expressions from 2010 can also influence interpersonally by provoking affective reactions in observers (Van Kleef, 2009). The emotions of others can engender emotional contagion (Hatfield et al., 1994)—the tendency to involuntarily and automatically catch other people's emotions through their facial expressions, vocalizations, postures or body movements (e.g. Anderson et al., 2003; Hawk et al., 2009; & Hess & Blairy, 2001; Neumann & Strack, 2000; Wild et al., 2001), or through verbal expressions of emotion (e.g. in computer-mediated interaction; Friedman et al., 2004; Thompson & Nadler, 2002; Retrieved 19 December 2014. When people catch the emotions of others, the resulting feeling can influence judgments and decisions through different types of effect infusion (cf.Forgas, 1995). First, can individuals (mis)attribute the affective state to the situation at hand, using their feelings as a contribution to their judgments and social decisions - one how do I feel about it? heuristics (i.e. affect-as-information; Schwarz & Clore, 1983). If they catch the happiness of others and, in this way, they get to experience positive feelings, they can judge the situation as safe and problem-free, allowing generosity and exploration rather than rigid exploitation (Ashby et al., 1999; Baas et al., 2008). Secondly, the emerging affective state may be that selectively related ideas and memories that are part of an associative network facilitate its use when planning and executing behaviors (i.e. affecting blinding; Bower, 1981; Isen et al., 1978). For example, people who work with a partner in a together they can trap the happiness of their partner, causing them to selectively focus on the cooperative efforts of the partner, which can lead them to increase their own cooperation. In a classic study, Carnevale and Isen (1986) manipulated the mood of negotiating couples. Half of the pairs were put in a the mood by giving them a bag of candy and making them read funny cartoons before trading; the other half did not receive these treatments. Being in a happy mood facilitated the exchange of cooperative information among negotiators, which helped them develop creative solutions that allowed the two sides to settle for something beyond a 50-50 split (i.m. they realized the integrative potential of the negotiation). In addition to these different forms of infusion affect, the emotions that individuals capture from their counterparts can influence social decisions through maintaining mood and negative state relief. The main hypothesis here is that people strive to promote and maintain positive moods and to avoid experiencing negative moods (Carlson et al., 1988; Retrieved 19 December 2012. This basic impulse motivates people in a negative mood to engage in behaviors associated with positive feelings (e.g. helping others) in order to alleviate their negative feeling (e.g. Cialdini et al., 1973; Schaller & Cialdini, 1988). Likewise, individuals in a positive mood are motivated to exhibit behaviors that produce positive feelings and to refrain from activities that involve the risk of spoiling good mood (i.e. maintaining positive mood; Wegener & Petty, 1994). In the current context, this means that when the couple feels happy, they can take the happiness of the couple and motivate themselves to maintain the positive feeling by acting in a friendly and generous way. Similarly, when the other expresses sadness, one can become equally smiling through emotional contagion and motivated to relieve himself of negative feelings by acting generously. Tania Singer, Anita Tusche, in Neuroeconomics (Second Edition), 2014So far away, this chapter has focused mainly on empathy and the human capacity to share the feeling of others. However, emotional phenomena such as emotional contagion and compassion (see box 27.1) closely related to empathy , but still different, play an important role in our social lives and crucially shape social interactions. In addition to profiling these social emotions, this section briefly addresses affective states such as schadenfreude and envy (see box 27.1) that oppose empathetic responses and prosocial motivation. Emotional contagion describes the phenomenon of an automatic adoption of someone else's emotional state. Compared to the nod to empathy introduced before (Vignemont and Singer, 2006; Singer and Lamm, 2009), this state of emotional exchange does not require knowledge about the origin of the affective experience (either triggered by another person or is within the observer). For example, long before the develop a sense of self, separated from others, begin to cry when they hear other babies crying (Simmer, 1971). Using fMRI and pupils, Neil Harrison and colleagues (2006) found initial evidence of pupil contagion. When subjects were presented with photos of sad faces with the size of the student, their own reflected pupil size shown in the photos. Here, emotional contagion compromised the Edinger-Westphal nucleus in the brain body that controls the size of the pupil. Phenomena such as pupil contagion occur involuntarily and can represent a precursor to empathy. However, empathetic responses are not considered because subjects are not aware that they feel vicariously by another person. Note, however, that although the concept distinguishes itself from empathy, emotional contagion is often thought to precede empathy (Singer and Lamm, 2009). Compassion, on the other hand, refers to a state that is associated with feeling concern for the suffering of another and desired to improve the well-being of this individual (Keltner and Goetz, 2007), which can occur without the affective exchange by the observer (Klimecki and Singer, 2012; Singer and Steinbeis, 2009). As described in Klimecki and Singer (2012), this definition of compassion is closely related to the concepts of empathetic concern used by Batson and colleagues (1983) and sympathy as used by Eisenberg and Fabes (1990). In other words, empathetic concern, but also compassion, can be described as feeling for another person, while empathy is characterized by feeling with someone (Batson, 2009). In accordance with this notation of shared affective states in empathy, it has been shown that subjects experience a marked negative effect when witnessing the anguish of another (Klimecki et al., 2012; Lamm et al., 2007b; Saarela et al., 2007). For example, using a new work of affective sociopathic video (SoVT), Klimecki and Singer (2012) presented themes with sequences of films of people in distressing situations. As a previous test, the subjects responded with strong negative impact to the task. Self-reported empathetic responses in reaction to the suffering of others were accompanied by increased activation in brain regions that have often been linked to empathy for pain such as ACC and AI (see Figure 27.2; for meta-analysis, see Lamm et al., 2011). It is important to note that after subjects received a brief training of compassion and adopted a compassionate state during the task, the positive effect increased when faced with the suffering of others. The adoption of a compassionate state when exposed to the anguish of others was also associated with greater activation in the medial orbitofrontal cortex (mOFC), ventral tegmental area / substantia nigra (VTA / SN), pallidum and putamen (see figure 27.5). Evidence from recent cross-disciplinary studies further supports the involvement of these structures in compassion: Using images of sad faces, Kim and colleagues (2009) found that taking a compassionate attitude toward the sad effect of another recruited the mOFC and VTA/SN. Similarly, the adoption of an attitude towards people with disabilities was found to involve VTA, pallidum and medium insula (Beauregard et al., 2009; see also Immordino-Yang et al., 2009; Lutz et al., 2008). Note that the insula has also been involved in studies on the effects of experience on compassion (Lazar et al., 2005; Lutz et al., 2004). Figure 27.5. Brain network associated with compassion. After a brief compassion training, the adoption of a compassionate state when exposed to the anguish of others was associated with greater activation in the medial orbitofrontal cortex (mOFC), ventral tegmental area / substantia nigra (VTA / SN), pallidum and putamen (Klimecki et al., 2012). The finding that compassion training increased the positive impact on witnessing the suffering of others (Klimecki et al., 2012) suggests that a culture of compassion could offer a new coping strategy that could help people cope with distressing social situations with greater resilience. Since both empathetic responses and emotional contagion in these situations could lead to the experience of personal distress and ultimately lead to withdrawal behavior to reduce negative emotions themselves (Batson et al., 1983; Eisenberg and Fabes, 1990; Klimecki and Singer, 2012), this result of a compassion training is particularly surprising. In addition to the advantageous effects of compassion training on positive effect (Fredrickson et al., 2008), recent evidence also indicates that neurological responses to stress could benefit from the adoption of this state of feeling (Pace et al., 2009). Initial evidence even suggests that short-term training of compassion can increase prosocial behavior towards others in a task unrelated to training (Leiberg et al., 2011). Next, we resort to other social emotions such as envy or crack that seem to counteract empathetic responses and prosocial motivation. Envy can be described as a negative emotional state in the face of another's fortune, while schadenfreude refers to a positive emotional state in the face of someone else's misfortune (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2007). Participants were found to be compared to someone else who was considered to possess desirable and self-sufation characteristics to respond with more envy and a corresponding increase in acc activation (Takahashi et al., 2009; see also Mobbs, 2009). Instead, when participants were presented with misfortune succeeding the envious person, they reported stronger schadenfreude (Takahashi et al., 2009). The latter was reflected in brain responses in ventral striatum (VS), supporting the notation of a gratifying nature of this affective state. According to this finding, Dvash and colleagues (2010) found greater activation in the VS for participants who lost money when the other player in a game lost even more money, accompanied by a stronger schadenfreude. Interestingly, reward-related activation in ventral and dorsal striatum has also been linked to affective states such as the desire to and altruistic punishment of deserters when equity preferences have been violated (from Quervain et al., 2004; Singer et al., 2006). Thus, Singer and colleagues (2006) found the activation of participants in the VS VS seeing an unfair player in pair, who was positively correlated with his desire for revenge, as assessed by the questionnaires after the scan session. Empathetic responses, on the other hand, were significantly reduced when they passively saw the pain of the unjust confederacy. These results suggest that motivational systems such as the desire for revenge can gain empathetic motivation when people face the suffering of another who they believe deserve to be punished. Interestingly, Hein and colleagues (2010) showed that the decision to refrain from helping a member of the group was related to activation in the VS when witnessing the other pain they experience. The empathy-related processing of AI participants for the suffering of another, on the other hand, predicted the decision to participate in a costly aid. These findings indicate that the opposite motivational systems of empathy on the one hand and envy, crack or revenge on the other side can be predictive of compromise in prosocial or selfish behavior. For more comprehensive coverage of these latest studies and of fairness and revenge see also the section When we care about others in this chapter, and Chapter 11 in this volume. Jane Mullen, ... E. Kevin Kelloway, in Handbook of Work-Family Integration, 2008 It is a fact that most employees live in some kind of family structure and that what happens to a family member affects others. Barnett (1998) found that negative work experiences for one couple created psychological distress for the other, an example of emotional contagion as a crossover effect. Some research has shown that negative family/diadic effects occur in one direction, with WFT conflict associated with family distress and dissatisfaction, poor family performance and family-related withdrawal. On the other hand, the WFT conflict is hypothetically related mainly to organized results (Frone, 1992). Subsequent studies (Aryee et al., 2005) suggest that both forms of family-work conflict predict lower family satisfaction, directly or indirectly (Bellavia & Frone, 2004). Perry-Jenkins, Repetti and Crouter (2000) in their review of the impact of work stress on families, point out that there is a substantial body of research that suggests that chronic work stress affects families when they induce feelings of role overload or role conflict between the two spheres. In Allen et al.'s meta-analysis (2000), the link between family-work conflict and family stress was clear; the weighted average correlation was .31. Overall, researchers have found that increased levels of WFT conflict are inversely related to marital functioning or adjustment (Barling, 1986). The WFT conflict has also been inversely related to satisfaction in most studies (Allen et al.; Frone, 2003). From the perspective of the facilitation of the WFT, Greenhaus and Powell (2006) noted that research suggests that the positive aspects of the working environment, such as support and have been associated with positive results in the family domain, such as family satisfaction (Frone et al., 1997; Voldanoff, 2001). It has also been suggested that work satisfaction is related to family satisfaction, and to the positive results of parenting and children (Barling, 1986; [1444: 23 December 2011]. Julius Kuhl, in Advances in Psychology, emotional expression of 2000, affective exchange and the dynamics of eye contact are examples of social behaviors that cannot be easily performed unless access to intuitive behavior control is facilitated by positive effect. This implication of the first assumption of modulation explains the common experience that positive mood is indispensable for the success of social interaction: It is difficult to consciously plan or control emotional expressions during social interaction without losing authenticity. A histrionic personality disorder (characterized by the dramatization of emotions and an exaggerated need to be in the spotlight) exemplifies an extreme case of exaggerated dependence on emotional contagion and other intuitive programs for social interaction combined with an inhibition of planning and analytical thinking (Figure 1). On the other hand, to the extent that emotional exchange based on emotional contagion is inhibited in reserved styles and corresponding personality disorders such as schizophrenic, paranoid and denialist personality types (Figure 1), critical cognitive beliefs are likely to develop for the simple reason that reserved people cannot be easily filled with enthusiasm for the activities proposed by their interacting partners : Without the capacity for emotional contagion, they are likely to remain at emotional distance and perceive others as potential intruders in their own emotional autonomy. On the other hand, according to the first assumption of modulation, a histrionic personality should be associated with an inhibition of the impact of thought on the volition control of the action (due to a dispositional fixation on the positive effect). According to this bypass, histrionic patients showed a right dominance over the left hemisphere of the brain (Smokier & Shevrin, 1979). Predictions about emotional contagion were recently confirmed in a Gusch study (1996) that explored the determinants of subjective satisfaction of the relationship between couples (married or not). Personality styles constructed as non-pathological analogs to classic personality disorders (Figure 1) were evaluated with a new personality questionnaire (Kuhl & Kazén, 1997). Compared to participants who scored low on scales evaluating reserved styles (i.g. styles associated with the inhibited positive effect, according to Figure 1), the high scorers had significantly lower rates of emotional contagion, since for the change of qualifications of the attractiveness of various leisure activities after a change of attention to the preferences of the respective partner. Nicholas M. Thompson, ... Michael J. Banissy in Neuroimaging Neuroimaging Social Cognition, and Character, 2016Psychopathy is a disorder characterized by atypical emotional responses and antisocial behaviors.130 Psychopathy is commonly associated with a reduced empathetic response, and this deficit has been revealed in several ways. For example, the willingness of psychopathic individuals to act in an antisocial way, with little evidence of concern about the impact these behaviors may have on others,130 suggests a diminished empathetic response. In addition, the results indicate that psychopathy is associated with a reduced physiological response in relation to perceptual emotional stimuli131,132 and when imagined in dangerous/fearsome situations.133,134 Research has also shown that children with psychopathic tendencies score at the measures of emotional contagion in response to the stimuli that describe the negative emotional experiences of others.133,135-137 Neuroimaging research indicates that the atypical empathetic results observed in psychopathic individuals may be associated with reduced activity in regions associated with emotional processing, as well as the suggestive evidence of abnormal functional neural activity in psychopathy, studies have also revealed that psychopathy is associated with structural abnormalities in A141 (for example, reduced volume of gray matter in this area and also in the amygdala).93.94 Volume of gray matter reduced in AI and amygdala has also been shown to correlate with cases of aggressive behavior and empathy levels in adolescents with disorder of conduct.93As previously THE SOME5 states that emotional contagion is a prerequisite for empathy and develops through associations learned between internal affective states and external signals indicated by the corresponding states in others. In addition to the empathy deficits observed in psychopathic individuals, there is evidence that psychopathy is characterized by atypical experiences regarding emotions themselves.142,143 Previous research suggests that people with psychopathy have abnormal emotional experiences, especially in relation to distressing emotions such as fear and sadness144; within the framework of SOME5, this atypical functioning could have a significant detrimental effect on the development of emotional contagion (and, therefore, empathy). If negative emotions and anxiety are experienced less frequently (and/or to a lesser extent) by children with psychopathy, it is logical that they would have fewer opportunities to learn the right associations between external affective signals and internal affective states, which leads to a lack of understanding with respect to the distressed states of others—thus inhibiting emotional contagion and empathy.5While there is solid evidence to support the proposal of a deficit in emotional contagion in individuals with psychopathy, these individuals are not harmed aspects of understanding experiences others.5 Psychopathy is often characterized by willingness and adeptness in the manipulation of others, usually for personal gain.145 These skills are largely based on tom, and indeed, the assertion that Tom's abilities remain intact in psychopathic individuals has been supported by a series of research.133,137,146,147Bird and Viding5 suggest that while Tom is intact in psycho (allowing people with psychopathic tendencies to cognitively represent the affective states of others), their reduced opportunities to form associations between internal emotional states and emotional cues exposed by others mean that they do not share the affective representations of others' anxiety, thus resulting in the characteristic empathetic deficits of this condition.G. Chierchia, T. Singer , in Decision Neuroscience, 2017Despite these differences, one aspect that empathy and mentalization have in common is that both require distinguishing one's own beliefs (i.e. when mentalizing) or affective states (i.e. when empathizing) from others. In other words, both processes require a self-other distinction [11,12]. Consequently, the definition of empathy provided above distinguishes it from non-contrary/automatic forms of motor or affective resonance with others, such as mimicry and emotional contagion, in which subjects do not know that their affective states were triggered by the corresponding states in others. In what follows we briefly illustrate each one in turn. Imitation refers to observed tendencies that subjects must involuntarily synchronize their facial expressions, postures or vocalizations to those of others[28]. Some of these responses can occur approximately 300-400 ms after the start of the stimulus (i.e. the observed face) and, therefore, it is unlikely to be the result of deliberative processes, but rather of paying attention. In relation to this, a corpus of studies has revealed the existence of neurons that shoot both when performing an engine program and observing that others run the same program[29]. These neurons, with potential mirror properties, have been observed in a widespread network of areas comprising the lower parietal lobe, the lower frontal rotation, and the supplementary/ventral premotor motor areas [30,31], and have often been maintained to help understand the actions of others. These brain areas, however, are clearly different from those generally observed in tasks specifically designed to induce empathy, such as AI and ACC[13]. On the other hand, these processes remain dissociable from empathy, since they do not need to consider affective states (as in the case of neural mirror responses to action observation), and/or do not require subjects to understand that their states were by others (as in mimicry). In relation to motor mimicry, emotional contagion is more specifically related to the affective state. However, when it comes to mimicry, emotional contagion requires neither distinction nor awareness. A compelling example contagious crying: the observation that when babies hear the sound of other babies crying (in relation to their own crying, white noise, or the crying sound of a child chimpanzee), they are more likely to cry (or show facial expressions of distress) in turn [32,33], a phenomenon observed in babies as young as 6 pm [32]. Notably, non-annual sucking and heart rate were reduced even when babies heard screams from others in their sleep [33,34], thus strengthening the idea that this form of contagion is in conclusive. In line with this, even in adults it has been shown that sad faces with different pupil diameters selectively cause proportional contractions of the student in observers (in relation to neutral, happy or angry faces) [35] and that younger pupils with sad faces made their faces seem sadder. Finally, a 2014 study by Engert and colleagues [36] found that physiological signatures of stress (such as cortisol levels) increased even when participants only observed others in stressful situations. This suggests that emotional contagion can also take place at the hormonal level. Finally, it is worth noting that, although mimicry and contagion are related, they are conceptually different[14]. For example, exhibiting affection-laden facial expressions is not always accompanied by the corresponding emotional states [37] and vice versa, there may be emotion contagion without motor mimicry (i.e. as when imagining others in pain without the corresponding facial expressions).C. Chad Woodruff, Larry Stevens in The Neuroscience of Empathy, Compassion and Self-Compassion, 2018Pineda, Singh, and Chepak (Chapter 10) take a relatively macroscopic approach to their subject, providing us with a sophisticated model of social cognition - which becoming the other is a means of understanding the other. Using concepts such as hierarchical and heterarchic organization (its H-H model) and interdependent versus intergenerative mechanisms, the authors present a model of social cognition. Of particular importance are the terms of differentiation, an impulse to develop self-recognition, how it differs from others, and integration, referring to the opposite process of union and social commitment. As a case study of social cognition, the authors refer to empathy, to point out multiple possible definitions and the need for a standardized taxonomy, and the role that neurobiology can play in this process of standardization. While the distinction between cognitive and emotional/emotional empathy is widely discussed, the authors cite Blair (2005) as invoking a third form, motor empathy. They go on to make the appeal that empathy is a superordinated category to the extent that it subsumes processes such as emotional contagion, sympathy and aid behavior, with neural processes operating in parallel. It could be argued that empathy is an emerging process to the extent that it happens when each of these subprocesses interacts in a specific way. It can be seen as lying on a continuous, from forms of empathy (e.g. emotional contagion) to more sophisticated elaborations (e.g. ToM). Based on the large number of species that possess at least the most rudimentary forms of empathy, the authors talk about Panksepp and Panksepp (2013) who proposed a three-level empathy hierarchy that explains the preservation of processes similar to empathy between species. It is said that primary processes depend on older phylogenetically subcortex and relate to processes such as emotional contagion. In this way, they provide a boot trap from which later species could evolve at secondary level, implying learning and memory. At the tertiary level there are the most sophisticated forms of empathy that involve the conscious experience of the mental states of others. They even extend their H-H model to compassion, suggesting that compassion implies a dissolution of their own distinctions (at odds with the positions of the authors of chapters 1, 2 and 3) and that it adds to empathy to the extent that it involves a motivation to help. A key evolutionary component of its model implies the idea that evolution cannot be selected for superordinated categories such as empathy, but that these categories can arise from the evolutionarily simpler mechanisms alluding to above. A suggested selection unit is mirror processing, as this mechanism can be seen as an underlying imitation and imitation, leading to a new method of learning. The combination of these most elementary functions is said to lead to the emergence of empathy and ToM.Tony D. Sampson, in Boundaries of Self and Reality Online, 2017For good reason perhaps, Carr (2014) described it as a newsletter of a dystopian future. He was referring to an experiment that Facebook conducted in 2014 with the manipulation of the emotional content of news channels and measuring the effect these manipulations had on the emotions of 689,003 of its users regarding how contagious they became (Kramer, Guillory, & Hancock, 2014). The researchers who conducted the experiment found that when they reduced the positive expressions shown by other users, they produced less positive and more negative messages. Similarly, when negative expressions were reduced, the opposite pattern occurred. Although the recorded levels of contagion were rather palpable, the researchers concluded that the emotions expressed by others on Facebook influence our own emotions, constituting experimental evidence of large-scale contagion through social networks (Kramer et al., 2014). In fact, even if this contentious and ethically sound attempt by Facebook to influence moods produced evidence of rampant contagion, the design and implementation of the experiment itself should alert us to a possible way of the type referred to in Laing, as mentioned above. As Carr comments (2014), the tireless experimental evidence of large-scale emotional contagion through social networks draws attention to the way in which of big data assemblies by marketers deals with human issues such as laboratory rats, while pointing to the widespread nature of manipulation by social media companies. What worried the study most, argues Carr (2014), was not in its design or its findings, but in its ordinaryness. This type of research is actually part of a visible tip of a huge and otherwise well-hidden iceberg in the social media industry (Carr, 2014). To be sure, the only thing that both triggers and Facebook apologists seem to agree on is that the manipulation of users of this type is rife on the Internet. Social networks provide a perfect test bed, or nursery, to cultivate and cause emotional contagion, since users are predisposed to share emotional experiences in exchange for the benefits of a software tool that allows them to share positive and negative experiences In fact, this mostly unconscious inclination to take on the experiences of feeling others and convey them as shared emotions is of obvious interest to marketers and strategists seeking to control affective relationships online. Despite the small media storm that arose after this particular attempt to manipulate emotions, many Facebook users will be oblivious to their involvement in attempts to manipulate shared experiences. Furthermore, they will not be aware of their inclination to respond to emotional suggestion in such a seemingly porous and imitated way. This is clearly an attractive proposition for marketers who want to avoid transparent marketing to people in the way that advertisers have traditionally done through discreet forms of the media. The point is that this tendency towards the direction of emotional experiences shared through social networks presents a very different type of commodification to the one commonly attributed to phenomenal self-modeling. This is no longer simply a process that involves the commercial colonization of an inland alienated self, as Williamson described it. On the contrary, this is the modification of shared experiences in the outside world. It is the capture of the auto/other relationship in a topology of sensory experiences designed and thin by a growing industry of experience. In addition, these staged productions of emotional contagion demonstrate the extent to which the border that divides others is perhaps an illusion. We may still experience our interactions on social media from a first-person perspective, but this is certainly a phenomenal misconception, which secretes us from the loop interactions of the social topologies in which we get into. We could say that the self is immersed in the radical relationship of social networks, which drives the action to mimic the sensory environments we inhabit. Emotional contagion is an example of self-other topology. It is social in relation and outsourced through experience beyond personal control. This is one of a number of to a very different type of alienation to the one that had previously been taken as internalized through a mirror representation of the world. These are our shared experiments that work in the commercial domain. These are our shared experiences that are captured in topology and used to induce us to share more experiences, imitate them and behave in certain ways. Is it any surprise then to discover that once we get caught up in these contagious topologies that many of us start believing in the same things, wish them the same things, hate the same things, love the same things, and feel the same threats and opportunities? We are, using the terms of Laing, the new captives and consumers, the cannon fodder of social media. Media.

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